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Passing judgement: credit rating processes 
as regulatory mechanisms of governance in 
the emerging world order 
Timothy J. Sinclair 
Center for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto 
ABSTRACT 
This article argues that certain knowledge-producing institutions located 
in the American financial industry - debt security or bond rating agencies - 
are significant forces in the creation and extension of the new, open global 
political economy and therefore deserve the attention of international 
political economists as mechanisms of 'governance without government'. 
Rating agencies are hypothesized to possess leverage, based on their 
unique gate-keeping role with regard to investment funds sought by 
corporations and governments. The article examines trends in capital 
markets, the processes leading to bond rating judgements, assesses the 
form and extent of the agencies' governance powers, and contemplates the 
implications of these judgements for further extension of the global politi- 
cal economy and the form of the emerging world order. 
Commercial credit is the creation of modern times and belongs in 
its highest perspective only to the most enlightened and best 
governed nations. Credit is the vital arm of the system of modern 
commerce. It has done more - a thousand times more - to enrich 
nations than all the mines of the world.' 
INTRODUCTION 
This article is about the rise of non-state forms of international authority, 
and the transformative effects these are having on economic relation- 
ships and political processes in the emerging post-Cold War world. Until 
the erosion of Soviet dominance over eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, 
and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself, international 
political relations were conditioned by an overriding concern with the 
maintenance of an effective security framework in which possible threats 
could be contained.2 With the end of the Cold War, and the obsolescence 
of many of the relationships undergirding this phenomenon, the atten- 
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tion of much of the scholarly international relations community has 
shifted from these concerns. While this very visible drama has been 
playing itself out on the nightly television news another has been 
unfolding behind closed doors. Starting in the early 1960s, offshore 
capital markets - places where funds are raised by selling debt obliga- 
tions and equity outside the constraints of government regulation - have 
rapidly become global in character, stimulated initially by a desire on the 
part of American financiers to get around the restrictive US banking laws 
created during the Depression.3 During the 1970s, and into the first half of 
the 1980s, the freedom of these non-national money markets was 
matched by a slackening of regulation within domestic finance indus- 
tries, led by the United States. Other governments, including those of 
Britain, Japan and Canada were obliged to follow this path or suffer 
declines in their own finance sectors, as funds were relocated to more 
open markets.4 Accordingly, during the 1980s, 'many of the boundaries 
between national financial markets dissolved and a truly global capital 
market began to emerge'.5 
What questions does the decline of Cold War tensions and the develop- 
ment of a global capital market raise? Among these are: What will be the 
new organizing principles of the emerging world order? Where will 
authority be derived in the post-Cold War era of global capital mobility? 
What new conceptual tools will scholars need to understand these 
phenomena? This article evaluates these questions through an analysis 
of debt security rating processes. Debt security rating is portrayed in this 
article as a significant mechanism of authority in its own right, and as an 
exemplar of the form of authority that is organizing the emerging world 
order. Accordingly, the generalizations developed here will have appli- 
cability beyond the capital markets. Leading off the article is an evalua- 
tion of trends in the division of authority between global civil society and 
national states.6 Rosenau's notion of 'governance without government' is 
then introduced as a way of understanding the new found influence of 
non-state institutions.7 Subsequently, the article evaluates specific de- 
velopments within international finance that have influenced which 
institutions and processes have gained authority and which have dimin- 
ished in power. These developments point to the significance of the 
rating agencies. Some basic background material is then provided on the 
agencies, followed by a discussion of debt security rating processes. 
What information goes into a rating and how this material is analysed are 
examined here. A more theoretical section follows in which the gover- 
nance 'powers' of the rating institutions are elaborated. This discussion 
is followed by an appraisal of the implications of rating agency gover- 
nance for investment, policy and national determination. Finally, the 
article returns to the broader theme of the future character of the emerg- 
ing world order in light of the mechanism identified. 
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GOVERNANCE 
The development of the global political economy (GPE) has irreparably 
changed the authority structures that developed with the rise of the 
Western state system subsequent to Westphalia. 'At the core of the new 
order', suggests Rosenau, is '... . a relocation of authority that [has] 
transformed the capacities of governments'.9 The 'state-centric system' of 
the Westphalian order is now being replaced by a 'multicentric system', 
bifurcated between state and non-state actors.'0 Because of the transna- 
tional character of many economic, political and climatic developments, 
'national governments are decreasingly competent to address and resolve 
major issues confronting their societies'." This does not mean that the 
sovereignty of states has ended, but rather, that the 'exclusivity and scope 
of their competence' has altered significantly, 'narrowing the range 
within which their authority and legitimacy are operative'.'2 These 
developments may also be interpreted as expressive of a political strategy. 
Gill has labelled this strategy the 'new constitutionalism', which seeks to 
/place restraints on the democratic control of public and private economic 
organization and institutions', premised on neo-liberal assumptions 
about the efficiency of market forces. He suggests that some states, such 
as the US, are likely to be less accountable to international market forces 
than others, based on their divergent positions within the GPE, and thus 
that 'some states are more sovereign than others in the emerging world 
order'."3 
Both Rosenau's and Gill's respective conceptions of the emerging 
world order problematize the mainstream assumptions about interstate 
relations and the nature of authority itself. The orthodox, neo-realist 
understanding of authority in international relations has been one that 
focuses on the legally binding actions of governments."4 Ferguson and 
Mansbach propose that authority be understood instead as a process in 
which 'law is only one possible source of legitimacy that enhances the 
capacity of political actors to govern effectively . . .'15 This implies that 
authority is socially constructed and based on some measure of voluntary 
compliance, as was the auctoritas of the Roman Senate. Auctoritas had the 
character of 'more than a counsel and less than a command; rather a 
counsel with which one could not properly avoid compliance'.'6 Based on 
such a notion of authority, 'a wide range of governmental and non- 
governmental entities may, in fact, govern effectively and thus be an 
"authority" or "polity" within their particular domain(s)'.'7 
Following in the conceptual footsteps of Foucault, Rosenau has de- 
veloped a useful way of thinking about these shifts in the location of 
authority in the emerging world order. He argues that the crucial cate- 
gory to think about is governance: the 'system of rule'.18 It only exists 
when it is accepted by the majority, whereas governments can function 
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(up to a point) despite opposition. Governance may exist without gov- 
ernment where there are 'regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity 
which function effectively even though they are not endowed with 
formal authority'."9 Similarly, one can conceive of government without 
governance. However, essential to identifying a regulatory mechanism is 
observing 'intentionality'."0 Governance only exists in self-conscious 
arrangements, and must be distinguished from arrangements which 
derive from the 'aggregation of individual decisions'.2' For example, a 
market is an aggregation of individual decisions and does not express 
governance in this sense, whereas market rules or institutions that 
intervene in markets represent self-conscious arrangements and thus 
regulatory mechanisms of governance.' The following section discusses 
the context in which the regulatory mechanisms of governance examined 
in this article have developed. 
THE CHANGING FORM OF GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
The argument is that the nature of wholesale financing has changed 
significantly over the last decade or so, and that this has affected the 
nature of the authority exercised in the capital markets by regulatory 
mechanisms. According to Sassen, since the 1980s, the 'marketplace has 
assumed new strategic and routine economic functions'.' Financing has 
increasingly become disintermediated, which has created information 
problems for those wishing to lend money and for those wishing to 
borrow. This process has led to the disempowerment of traditional 
intermediating institutions, notably banks, and the empowerment of 
others, such as debt security rating agencies. 
Two ways of organizing the allocation of investment funds have been 
in competition with each other since the rise of the GPE. The primary 
way in which funds have been loaned and borrowed has been through 
banks. Banks act as financial intermediaries in that they bring together 
the suppliers of funds and the users of funds. They borrow money, in the 
form of deposits, and lend at their own risk to borrowers. Those who 
deposit money in banks and those who borrow from them do not 
establish a contractual relationship with each other, but only with the 
bank.24 Banks cover the costs of intermediation and make a return on their 
investment by charging the users or borrowers of funds more than they 
pay to the suppliers or lenders of funds. This structure is threatened by 
the trend toward disintermediation. In this process, flows of funds 
between borrowers and lenders avoid the direct use of financial inter- 
mediaries, for instance, in cases in which companies withdraw their 
funds from banks and lend them directly to each other, or when corpora- 
tions issue commercial paper that may merely be underwritten by a bank 
or investment bank."5 Globally, bank lending decreased from 37 per cent 
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of total capital movements in the 1977-81 period to 14 per cent in 1982-6. 
Portfolio, as opposed to direct forms of investment grew during the same 
period from 36 per cent in 1972-6, to 65 per cent of total investment in 
1982-6. Most of this was funded through securities offerings.26 Commer- 
cial banks increasingly take on the characteristics of investment or 
merchant banks, organizing issues, underwriting them, buying and 
selling debt in the secondary market, but not carrying these obligations 
on their own balance sheets.27 
Why has this trend toward disintermediation developed? Part of this 
story clearly has to do with the locus of control evident in securities 
issues versus either equity or bank debt.28 Banks typically want cove- 
nants that limit the application of funds by the borrower so that their 
interest stream is covered first. They might also place limits on the 
leveraging of the corporation that prevent it from raising its debt load, 
hindering management's plans for new plant and equipment. Moreover, 
'[b]ank lending is inherently more expensive than securitisation' be- 
cause of the high overhead costs generated by the credit monitoring 
function of intermediation.29 The high interest rates and elevated loan 
defaults of the 1980s made these differentials very significant. In the case 
of equity finance, stock holders may expect some involvement in the 
major decisions of the corporation, as is their right as owners of the 
enterprise. 
What are the implications of this trend? Has the authority that used to 
reside in banks dissipated, or has it taken a new form? Disintermediation 
creates an information problem for suppliers and users of funds.?" In an 
intermediated environment a lender can depend on the prudential 
behaviour of the bank, which is regulated and required to maintain a 
certain liquidity under the Basle standards. There is relatively low risk to 
the supplier of funds where intermediation is the norm. However, in a 
securitized funds environment in which no institution stands between 
the supplier of funds and the user, the supplier must make a judgement 
about the likelihood of repayment by the user. Given the high transaction 
costs of gathering this information for individual funds suppliers it is not 
surprising that institutions have developed to provide judgements on 
the creditworthiness of security issuers.31 Because there is no merchant 
relationship between providers of these judgements and the users of this 
knowledge with regard to the funds themselves, this is not the same form 
of relationship that banks have had with their customers. The providers 
of the judgement risk only their credibility, not their balance sheet when 
they conduct this business. This interest is in making an accurate rating, 
not in determining which are reliable credits for the purpose of further- 
ing their own balance sheet. However, in a disintermediated GPE, in 
which the creation and sale of knowledge seems to be displacing more 
traditional financial relationships from centre stage, these institutions of 
137 
ARTICLES 
capital market judgement may have become regulatory mechanisms of 
governance. It is to these mechanisms - the debt security rating agencies 
- that this article now turns. 
DEBT SECURITY RATING 
Debt security rating agencies had their beginnings in the early part of 
this century as a result of failed railroads, Florida land schemes and other 
property deals in the far West of the United States.32 Two major agencies 
dominate the market in ratings, listing around US$3 trillion each.33 A host 
of smaller agencies compete for market niches. The two major agencies 
are Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) and Standard & Poor's Ratings 
Group (S&P). Both are headquartered in New York. Moody's is owned by 
Dun and Bradstreet, the information concern, while S&P is a subsidiary 
of McGraw-Hill, the publishing company. S&P is split into two major 
groups, one that deals with debt rating, and the other with equity 
analysis. A demarcation line separates the two parts of the corporation. 
Moody's concern themselves exclusively with debt, although parts of 
their parent corporation conduct equity research.' Both agencies have 
branches in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Tokyo and Sydney. Two American 
agencies dominate the second tier. These are Fitch Investors Service and 
Duff & Phelps. Fitch is mainly in the business of municipal and corporate 
rating, while Chicago-based Duff & Phelps exclusively rates industrial 
corporations. Neither has any presence outside the USA, although Fitch 
did have a European presence at one time. IBCA, a London-based agency 
that has its roots in rating banks, has in recent years expanded its 
business into the corporate area. It now has offices in New York, Paris, 
Madrid and Tokyo. It recently merged with Euronotation of France, in 
what may be the first step toward the creation of a 'true European rating 
agency'.35 In addition, there are a host of domestically focused agencies in 
a number of countries, including Japan, France, Canada, Israel, Brazil, 
Mexico, South Africa, and most recently, the Czech Republic.6 Rumours 
constantly circulate in the financial press about the creation of a German 
rating agency.37 
What do bond raters actually do? Bond raters make judgements on the 
'future ability and willingness of an issuer to make timely payments of 
principal and interest on a security over the life of the instrument'. I The 
more likely 'the borrower will repay both the principal and interest, in 
accordance with the time schedule in the borrowing agreement, the 
higher will be the rating assigned to the debt security'.39 Ratings are made 
on corporations, financial institutions, municipalities, and sovereign 
governments in terms of long-term obligations such as bonds or short- 
term obligations such as commercial paper. The processes that lead to a 
rating will be discussed below. The product the bond raters produce is a 
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letter symbol reflecting a relative ranking on a scale from most to least 
creditworthy. The agencies are adamant that a debt rating is 'not a 
recommendation to purchase, sell, or hold a security, inasmuch as it does 
not comment as to market price or suitability for a particular investor', 
because investors' risk/return trade-offs vary.40 What bond raters do must 
be distinguished from equity analysis, where a buy/sell recommenda- 
tion is fundamental. It has become a convention in the industry to 
distinguish between investment and speculative grade credits as a result 
of US state laws enacted during the interwar period which limited the 
investment opportunities of pension funds to those above a certain 
benchmark.4" S&P provide four categories of investment grade, from 
AAA to BBB and seven of speculative grade, from BB to D (for default). 
Moody's rank from Aaa to Baa3, and Bal to C respectively.42 Both agencies 
have other scales for short-term debt obligations such as commercial 
paper. Bond raters maintain surveillance over the issues they rate and 
will warn investors when they consider that developments may lead to a 
revision to an existing rating in either an upward or downward direction. 
The following section of this article investigates the elements of the 
rating process. 
RATING METHODOLOGY 
Most securities issuers approach the rating agencies themselves to initi- 
ate the rating determination, although the bond raters do on occasion 
approach the issuer when they become aware that a major issue is about 
to be offered for sale. Recently, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) Rule 415 has allowed issuers to file in advance in order to sell a 
given value of securities in the US when market conditions are agreeable. 
This has meant that corporations have been able to bring a new issue to 
market at very short notice. As a consequence, 'it has become common 
practice for issuers' managements to meet with S&P analysts on a regular, 
reasonably frequent basis, regardless of whether a new issue is immi- 
nent'.43 Three types of information flow into the rating process. The first 
type of information is the publicly available kind. This includes quantita- 
tive information such as audited financial statements and qualitative 
information such as media reports on the state of the industry, munici- 
pality or country. The second type is the information disclosed by the 
issuer themselves. This includes up-to-date financial information on the 
operating position of the entity. But it also includes qualitative informa- 
tion on accounting policy, management experience and skill, competitive 
position and corporate strategy. The third type of information is pro- 
vided by competitors of disgruntled former employees of the issuer, 
amongst others. The bond raters claim this sort of information is uncom- 
mon and is treated sceptically, but they exhibit no qualms about asking 
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questions of the issuer based on these anonymous tips." These informa- 
tion flows are always supplemented with extensive meetings between 
issuer and rater. The actual rating is made by vote in a rating committee, 
sometimes disparagingly referred to as the 'Star Chamber', on the 
recommendation of the analytical team.45 The composition of the rating 
committees and the internal deliberations within the rating agencies on 
any particular issue are kept strictly confidential. The judgement that is 
made by the committee weighs the quantitative and qualitative factors in 
each case because 'there is no formula for combining these scores to 
arrive at a rating conclusion'. Accordingly, 'such judgements are highly 
subjective. Yet that is at the heart of every rating.'" The rating is generally 
subject to appeal by the issuer. But there is no regulatory requirement for 
this: rating opinions are defendable as free speech within the terms of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.47 
Rating methodology varies by the nature of the credit. In the case of 
industrial debt, it is important to understand that ratings do not reflect 
merely the accounting or financial position of the enterprise. While that 
is considered fundamental to the likelihood of successful repayment of 
obligations, understanding financial risk is not sufficient. Financial 
considerations such as debt/equity ratios of various kinds are considered 
alongside business risk factors that influence the probability of a suffi- 
cient stream of funds flowing into the business to meet obligations.48 In 
the case of municipalities, the bond raters make judgements about the 
future prospects for the tax base and the professionalism of local govern- 
ment, amongst other variables.49 This led to controversy when Moody's 
downgraded the City of Detroit in November 1992. City officials consid- 
ered that they had met the stringent quantitative criteria for greater 
confidence, which had to do with the City budget, while Moody's based 
its negative view of the City on 'extraordinarily weak credit fundamen- 
tals' in Detroit itself, such as depopulation (the City is expected to shrink 
to 400,000 by 2012, from around one million people in 1992, which is 
already down 44 per cent on 1950), maximal tax rates and unemployment 
at twice the US average. Moreover, the vast majority of the City residents 
are poor. Raymon L. Flynn, the Mayor of Boston and past president of the 
United States Conference of Mayors, is critical of the inclusion of factors 
such as these by the bond raters because he believes these are the sort of 
issues that should be judged by the electorate and do not impact directly 
on creditworthiness.' In the case of sovereign credits, a judgement has to 
be made by the agencies not just about the capacity to repay but also the 
willingness to repay. This is an important consideration because 'the 
enforceability of a legal claim against a sovereign government by a 
foreign investor is limited at best'.5' 
Creditworthiness is a dynamic condition and the quality of the rating 
output immediately starts to deteriorate as new events occur which 
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impact on the liquidity and solvency of the debtor. Accordingly, the 
agencies place a great deal of emphasis on monitoring the condition of 
issuers on a continuous basis. This allows them to react to events more 
readily and give appropriate signals to the market about the condition of 
an issuer. This is important, because one of the major criticisms of the 
agencies has been the backward or historical focus of much of their credit 
analysis.52 Attention to surveillance presumably improves the quality of 
analysis, based on a much deeper institutional knowledge of their credits 
by rating analysts, and consequently heightened awareness of likely 
risks. The willingness of firms to subject themselves to this monitoring 
has been heightened by the aforementioned SEC Rule 415, as taking 
advantage of 'shelf registration' in the market requires up-to-date rat- 
ings.53 The surveillance relationship can readily be characterized in terms 
of an instituted system of rule, in which information is gathered as a 
prelude to possible discipline, should that information reveal a break in 
the understanding - or rating - that underpinned the relationship.4 That 
discipline may take the form of a rating review and rating change, or a 
listing on Moody's 'Watchlist' and S&P's 'Credit Watch' lists which signal 
positive and negative rating implications of events or trends. Import- 
antly, S&P place emphasis on the fact that credibility is gained when the 
'record demonstrates' that an issuer's actions are consistent with its 
plans. This credibility may carry an issuer over a rough patch, because, 
'Once earned, credibility can support the continuity of a particular credit 
rating' despite, say, short-term liquidity problems.55 The next section of 
this article evaluates the extent to which the rating agencies can be 
considered mechanisms of governance. 
RATING AGENCIES AS REGULATORY MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE 
The Masters of the Universe were a set of lurid, rapacious plastic 
dolls.... They were unusually vulgar, even for plastic toys. Yet one 
fine day, in a fit of euphoria, after [Sherman McCoy] had picked up 
the telephone and taken an order for zero-coupon bonds that had 
brought him a $50,000 commission, just like that, this very phrase 
had bubbled up into his brain. On Wall Street he and a few others - 
how many? - three hundred, four hundred, five hundred? - had 
become precisely that. . . Masters of the Universe. There was . .. no 
limit whatsoever!56 
Three developments have contributed to the growth of the regulatory 
authority of debt security rating during the era of the GPE. These are the 
structural power of disintermediated debt finance, the knowledge struc- 
ture that has developed around economic and financial analysis in the 
GPE, and the coordinative position of rating agencies with regard to 
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economic and financial behaviour. The first development has been 
discussed above. Disintermediation has led to the growth of the struc- 
tural power of securitized finance, in which structural power is under- 
stood as the capacity to condition the context in which events occur, as 
opposed to the behavioural power over the course of events themselves, 
by shaping the conceptual frameworks that market actors use to under- 
stand situations and the subsequent range of choices they consider to be 
within the acceptable range.57 The same process has reduced the struc- 
tural power of banks and public authorities. An article in The Wall Street 
Journal just prior to the 1992 US presidential election ruminated on this 
power. The report posed the question of whether the debt security 
market 'may now hold unprecedented power - perhaps even veto power 
- over US economic policy'.58 US federal debt, it reported, stood at around 
$3 trillion, with interest costs of approximately $200 billion per year. If 
President Clinton was thought likely to pursue a strategy perceived to be 
inflationary (and therefore reduces the yield on fixed income securities 
such as US Treasury bonds) the reaction, according to the Journal, is likely 
to be 'swift and painful' in the electronically-linked secondary market. 
This would in turn raise the price or interest rate the Treasury would have 
to offer to clear the market in new US Treasury bonds. Because 'many 
other long-term rates, such as mortgage rates are keyed to the Treasury 
debt, rising long-term rates can stagger the economy'. This power has led 
the players in the debt security market to be labelled 'bond vigilantes', 
because when inflation threatens their earnings 'they act as vigilantes to 
restore law and order to the market and the economy'. According to the 
Journal, Clinton's plans at the time of the election seemed to imply a $20 
billion net increase in federal spending in the 1994 fiscal year. If bond 
buyers were to react with even modest anxiety to this prospect and send 
long-term rates up by, possibly, one percentage point, the US deficit 
would increase by $20 billion, effectively doubling to $40 billion the net 
cost of President Clinton's new policies. But this is an unlikely scenario, 
concluded the Journal reporters at the time because, according to Edward 
Yardeni of C.J. Lawrence Inc., the bond vigilantes are 'forcing Clinton to 
recognize that they will be voting every day the bond market is open', and 
if Clinton ignores them, he will find out very quickly who is in the 
'driver's seat'. Makers of public policy, like corporate executives who 
want access to cheap finance, must acknowledge the structural power of 
disintermediated finance and incorporate debt security markets into 
their policy agendas and market plans at the earliest stages, and not as an 
afterthought. This precognition must in turn expand the authority of 
rating agencies as these institutions are a primary vehicle through which 
the actions of issuers are examined and judged. 
The second factor which contributes to the regulatory capacity of rating 
agencies is their provision of knowledge to the increasingly de- 
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centralized financial markets. Strange has argued that knowledge struc- 
tures exist which have the effect of valuing or devaluing different forms of 
knowledge.59 She considers that a knowledge structure 'determines what 
knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, and who communicates it by 
what means to whom and on what terms'."' This structure, created by the 
dominant social forces and their major concerns, comprises a certain 
pattern of incentives and constraints on the development of forms of 
knowledge. The structural empowerment of the capital markets has been 
matched by a new valuation of certain forms of knowledge. The creation 
of the Euromarkets and the deregulation of capital movements charac- 
teristic of the past 20 years have greatly increased the mobility of money 
within the global economy.61 Walter B. Wriston, the former Chair of 
Citicorp, has concluded from these developments that an 'information 
standard' now exists in which the mobility of investment funds is 
maximized through the rapid information transfers possible with con- 
temporary communications technology.62 This standard acts as a con- 
straint on forces that would seek to create, for example, more narrowly 
regulated environments for investment, as the owners and managers of 
those funds will seek to circumvent possible controls on the freedom to 
maximize. However, raw information is not the most important consid- 
eration. What is crucial is the valuation placed on analytic frameworks 
having to do with economic and financial advice. This valuation has 
grown because of the increased uncertainty resulting from the greater 
volatility of international financial transfers. Corporations and govern- 
ments want to reduce or at least specify the amount of risk they are 
assuming.' However, the increasing demand for this form of information 
and the consequent growth in its authoritativeness belies the processes 
of judgement which are central to it. These processes are based on certain 
assumptions tied to dominant interests in society, as Strange's concep- 
tion of a knowledge structure implies. What is characteristic of this 
framework is the domination of narrow assumptions about market 
efficiency, in which undistorted price signals are the objective and state 
intervention is generally considered meddlesome.M4 Typically, 'transition 
costs' (such as unemployment) are not factored into the advice but 
assumed to be outweighed by the new environment created. However, 
this is merely an 'article of faith' of this framework, as Granovetter has 
pointed out.i5 
Foucault argued that 'particular technical devices' or 'intellectual tech- 
nology' such as writing, listing, and numbering render a realm knowable 
and therefore potentially controllable. These procedures of inscription of 
'objects' such as the economy, the corporation and so on are 'rendered in a 
particular conceptual form', which have implications for governance.6 
Rather than a series of ideas which exist in a political vacuum, knowledge 
is, in fact, as Smith has argued, a form of social organization with 
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dominating and subordinating dimensions.67 Her argument is that 
knowledge, once produced, loses its connection with those who have 
created it. It becomes 'externalized' and debates, findings and opinions 
come to stand alone and acquire 'facticity'.1 Illustrating this phe- 
nomenon, Leo C. O'Neill observed that [sic] 'what makes our ratings such 
a strong factor in the market is that they take into account all the factors 
that surround a debt obligation and reduce it to a letter symbol which is 
easily understood'.69 This process, which limits the conceptual universe of 
social actors involved, can be seen in the salience that ratings have 
acquired, for example, in the corporate planning process in the US.70 
Ratings are also ubiquitous in advertising. Both the Union Bank of 
Switzerland and Credit Suisse used ratings in print advertisements 
during 1992, most notably in The Economist. One of these advertisements, 
for Union Bank, began with the line, 'There are three standards for 
measuring banks: Moody's, S&P's and our clients.' Ratings have also 
been used in television commercials, most recently for Canada Trust.7' 
The final factor which has contributed to the regulatory capacity of 
rating agencies is the fact that they are institutions in what is an 
increasingly deinstitutionalized context, where traditional forms of au- 
thority and organization are less and less evident. Banks are no longer the 
sources of authority they once were, and governments have increasingly 
become (sic) 'nightwatchmen' over their capital markets rather than 
allocators or managers of capital investment. This leaves few institutions 
left with oversight and knowledge of the market, other than market 
participants. This must increase the structural power of debt rating 
agencies. That rating agency judgements are increasingly the subject of 
media analyses probably reflects the understanding that the 'bean coun- 
ters' have become important sources of coordination within an in- 
creasingly decentralized system. A 'steering mechanism' seems to have 
developed,' albeit imperfectly, to contain some of the contradictions 
generated by the liberalization of markets and provide a 'degree of 
orderliness' to corporate behaviour.7' According to Mintz and Schwartz, 
this 'orderliness' has two aspects. The first aspect relates to situations 
where the agencies 'directly intervene in the affairs of a corporation' and 
in 'certain circumstances . .. dictate corporate policy'.74 The other dimen- 
sion captures the broader sense of rating agency power as mechanisms of 
regulatory governance, through the exercise of structural power. In this 
dimension, the agencies can be seen to in part create a 'set of de facto 
rules' which 'responsible corporate citizens' must honour or 'risk finan- 
cial disfavour'.75 According to Mintz and Schwartz, this has created a 
situation of hegemonic control in which corporate activity is conditioned 
by the desire to appeal to the preferences of the rating agencies so as to 
gain access to cheap capital, or conversely, not to lose such competitively 
advantageous access.76 It seems that the 'internationalized policy pro- 
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cess', which provides some measure of coordination within the GPE, 
occurs not just at the level of relations between states, but within 
transnational capital itself. Two considerations are important with regard 
to these transnational regulatory institutions. The first of these is the 
inadequacy of the existing interstate framework for macroeconomic 
coordination. Group of Seven or European Union structures have not 
proven themselves adequate to meet these challenges, as the global 
exchange crisis in the fall of 1992 has indicated. Yet the process of 
articulating and reinforcing the knowledge structure of economic and 
financial analysis through non-state institutions seems to have produced 
considerable change at the microeconomic policy level, as exemplified by 
some Latin American countries. The second consideration is that these 
forms of governance are, of course, private in nature, not subject to the 
usual forms of public accountability. Governance of the type identified 
here may reflect and in turn help to constitute a world order in which the 
demands of investment maximization are increasingly unchallenged. 
The following section explores the implications of rating agencies consid- 
ered as regulatory mechanisms of governance. 
IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY GOVERNANCE 
What you consumed over your lifetime was in part borrowed, and 
even today it still is . . . but at the end of the day if people don't 
believe it, then someone will pull the plug . .. the only difference 
between an African Third World state and a Canada or New 
Zealand is that they actually hit the end of their credit limit very 
quickly; we're given much more rope to hang ourselves with ... 
but when your credit rating is on the line, that focuses the mind.7 
Growth in the structural power of debt security rating can be assessed in 
three broad categories. The first set of implications is for investment, the 
second is for policy choice and the third is for national determination. 
What are the implications for investment? The investigation of rating 
agency governance for investment is broken down into three sets of 
questions. First, the question of cost of capital. Do ratings make a 
difference to the cost of debt? Second, there is the important issue of the 
perception of the role of ratings. What tells us that people in the market 
think that ratings are crucial? Finally, there is the question of the 
perception of rating agencies as powerful. Are bond raters acknowledged 
as quasi-public authorities? Is it a widespread view that bond raters are 
part of the context of the market, although there may be criticism of them 
at the margins? 
The primary influence on the new issue and secondary corporate bond 
markets as a whole are shifts in interest rates.78 These determine the price 
that issuers as a collective must offer to attract funds into their market and 
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away from other investment opportunities such as banks, the stock 
market and real estate. Beyond these general influences there are the 
particular circumstances of the debt instrument itself. For example, 
whether the bond is backed by a sinking fund, in which the issuing 
company sets aside revenue for the purpose of debt repayment.79 Other 
things being equal, the primary factor that distinguishes between dif- 
ferent bonds is the creditworthiness of the borrower. However, as Foster 
observes: 'There is a dispute in the literature over whether debt-security 
ratings convey new information to capital market participants (that is, 
beyond that already in the public domain from other sources).'8" It may be 
the case that the market has made its own assessment of the creditworthi- 
ness of the issuer. Quantitative analysis has not progressed sufficiently to 
attribute causation. This controversy is even more pronounced with 
regard to the impact of downgrades on yield spreads in the secondary 
market, as one rater observed.8' 
Despite the confusion in the quantitative literature, ratings are cer- 
tainly perceived to have a major influence on the cost of capital by market 
participants.82 It is these perceptions, rather than an inherent reality, that 
ultimately shapes the impact that ratings have on economic and financial 
policy. If issuers believe that ratings and the gradations between them are 
very important this will shape their commercial behaviour. If bond 
holders believe ratings to be important information this will influence 
their decisions to buy and sell debt. There are two levels on which market 
actors and others perceive ratings to be important. The first of these has to 
do with what Gill and Law have called the behavioural form of power.83 At 
this level the actions of rating agencies are perceived to have a direct effect 
upon market perception and thus upon the views of debt issuers and 
their behaviour. As Mintz and Schwartz comment, at this level the 
agencies reveal their capacity to 'directly intervene in the affairs of a 
corporation'.8' The clearest instance of this form of leverage is the impact 
of rating downgrades on the US auto industry. The history of rating 
actions goes back to the early 1970s, in the case of the Chrysler corpora- 
tion. However, the most prominent recent example of the perceived 
behavioural leverage of rating agencies is General Motors (GM). 
At the end of 1991, GM announced it had made a 'disastrous $4.5 
billion loss' on operations.85 Subsequently, the corporation declared that 
it would close 21 plants and cut 74,000 jobs.' According to Cox, this 'was 
intended, by appearing as a token of the corporation's intention to 
increase competitiveness, to deter a down-grading of its bond rating 
which would have increased the corporation's cost of borrowing'.87 The 
perceived threat of a downgrade was reinforced by The Wall Street Journal, 
which noted that the threat of a rating reduction had 'hung heavily' over 
Robert C. Stempel, GM's chairman at the time, and had 'pushed' him to 
speed up the announcement of restructuring plans.'8 However, Stempel's 
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strategy did not work and the huge corporation was downgraded by 
Moody's in January 1992, and by Standard & Poor's in March of that 
year.89 In justifying their action Moody's officials said that they consid- 
ered the auto maker's restructuring plans were unlikely to solve its 
competitive problems.90 Pressure on GM from the agencies did not end 
with these downgradings. According to Judith H. Dobrzynski of Business 
Week, 'the prospect of sinking credit ratings that would deny it access to 
equity and commercial paper, eventually prompted independent direc- 
tors' to pressure GM's 'old guard', as personified by Chairman Stempel, 
the 'deliberative engineer', to quit in late October 1992.91 Subsequently, 
further warnings of possible downgrades in the form of rating reviews 
came from the agencies, including the possibility of the relegation of GM 
debt to junk bond status.92 Although the agencies subsequently acknowl- 
edged some improvement in operating performance at GM, what seems 
to have tipped the agencies into the further downgrades of late Novem- 
ber 1992 and February 1993 were unfunded pension costs and escalating 
medical benefit liabilities which threatened to substantially degrade 
GM's balance sheet.93 As S&P commented, 
Servicing its massive benefits obligations will be a substantial 
drain on the company's financial resources - and a significant 
competitive disadvantage - for the foreseeable future.... GM's 
unfunded pension liability increased to $14.0 billion at year-end 
1992, from $8.4 billion one year earlier ... the company has re- 
ported a retiree medical liability of $24 billion . .. reflecting not only 
assumption revisions, but the failure to negotiate with the United 
Auto Workers an agreement to cap future benefits. Adjusting for 
these liabilities effectively eliminates GM's consolidated net worth, 
in contrast to GM's reported equity of $6.2 billion at year-end 1992.94 
Fearing this sort of judgement, which has hampered General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation (GM's finance company subsidiary) by raising 
the cost of commercial paper sales, GM has been forced to raise bank lines 
of credit instead, 'completing the largest bank credit package ever', with 
the attendant costs of intermediation, as discussed elsewhere in this 
article.95 GM has also been raising relatively high-cost equity capital in 
response to the impact of reduced credit ratings on the cost of debt 
finance.96 
The second type of leverage the agencies possess is structural power. 
Because it has to do with frameworks of thought, structural power is 
much harder to detail empirically and disentangle from other influences 
on the way managers think and act. However, it is also probably the more 
significant aspect of the relationship between rating agencies and the 
capital markets. A flavour of this structural power can be picked up from 
trade journals such as Institutional Investor and Euromoney, which act as 
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mouthpieces for industry concerns about rating proficiency. These help 
to spread the understanding amongst pension fund managers - the 
lenders of funds - and corporate CFOs (chief finance officers) and their 
public sector equivalents - the borrowers of funds - that rating agencies 
expect more than just getting the numbers right from credits, that credits 
are expected to show foresight in management and business acumen, as 
well as financial prudence.97 A measure of the structural power of the 
rating agencies can be gained from Glen Yago's observation that 'In some 
of my discussions in Washington [relating to the junk bond phe- 
nomenon], I found Congressional leaders who mistakenly thought that 
rating and credit analysis of bonds was done by government agencies 
and federally mandated.'98 Another indication of the structural power of 
rating agencies is that US corporations often write ratings targets into 
their corporate plans for the coming financial year.9 As Emmer com- 
mented, those corporations that failed to follow this path learnt in 1991, 
during a time of stringent bank credit rationing, the costs of not adopting 
this standard. Indeed, interviews in London confirmed the fact that 
recessionary conditions have heightened the structural leverage of rating 
agencies, as alternative sources of credit, such as bank loans, dry up and 
as difficult operating conditions induce a desire to play a more cautious 
commercial game."? These factors place a greater emphasis on taking the 
views of rating agencies into account prior to rating determinations. 
If rating agencies have behavioural and structural leverage over corp- 
orations it becomes a question of whether rating agencies are a new form 
of financial intermediation? Has the old type of intermediation by banks 
simply given way to a new intermediary in the form of a rating agency? 
The answer to this question seems to be no. Rating agencies do not have 
the same relationship to borrowers and lenders as banks do. They neither 
lend nor borrow like banks, and thus have entirely different legal 
obligations. Nor do they place their balance sheets directly on the line 
when they issue a rating. While their credibility is at stake (and the 
importance of this cannot be understated) this does not establish the 
same incentives on behaviour as entering into a financial transaction. 
There is no pecuniary advantage to the rating agency from any particular 
rating determination, whereas this is the case with financial transactions 
between banks and their customers. Thus, the nature of the contract in 
either case places different incentives on banks and rating agencies 
which lead to different roles in the market and distinguishable effects on 
capital allocation. Bond raters simply want to issue a rating which reflects 
the probability of repayment at the contracted rate of interest at the right 
time. Banks want to minimize their cost of borrowing and maximize 
their real return from lending, within the context of competing suppliers 
of capital. The different incentives on bond raters and suppliers of capital 
is reflected in the common criticism of bond raters made within the 
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financial markets, that they look at creditworthiness in historical terms, 
once removed from what is happening in the market."'0 
A further implication for investment could be that the international 
growth of ratings through the creation of agencies modelled on American 
lines and through the establishment of foreign subsidiaries by the 
American agencies will export US models of financial orthodoxy. An 
element of this orthodoxy would appear to be a characteristically short- 
term investment horizon. This tendency reveals itself in the concern of 
pension fund managers with the quarterly performance of their assets 
and their readiness to dump a security in the secondary market when it is 
not performing at an acceptable yield.'02 As Ronald D. Peyton, of Callan 
Associates, a pension fund consulting firm, commented to Business Week, 
'I doubt there's an investment manager in America whose contract 
doesn't have a 30-day cancellation clause."03 These time horizons, which 
raise the risks and therefore the cost of capital in the US, seem to exist 
because of the relatively distant relationship between suppliers and users 
of capital."4 A major element of this antagonism is the lack of information 
investors have on the businesses they invest in. Only the 'outward 
manifestations' given in quarterly earnings data are considered funda- 
mental in investment decision making."' The high cost of capital has 
business investment and management consequences which inhibit 
long-term planning for competitiveness, as seems to have been the case 
in differences between Japan and the United States."6 Debt security 
rating agencies contribute to the divorce between suppliers and users of 
capital to the extent that their analysis merely reflects orthodox US 
theories of finance, and perhaps to the extent that they seek a uniform 
comparative system of rating world wide. Moreover, ratings themselves, 
as expressions of a 'neutral' judgement about a corporation, can often 
take on a life of their own and 'crowd out' analysis by the investor. This 
may be especially the case with large institutional investors such as 
pension funds."7 Ratings may also have the effect of making some 
corporations overly prudent in their business activities. Ratings may 
become objectives in themselves, enshrined in corporate plans even 
where this raises the cost of capital for the concern in question and lowers 
long-term profitability."' This mark of esteem seems to have been of 
special concern to the Swiss banks who, as discussed, use their AAA 
ratings in advertising. It would be ironic if the international growth 
ratings based on US methodology and assumptions led to this sort of 
outcome overseas, just as US business leaders are calling for a greater role 
for the equity investor in corporate governance, so as to create the sort of 
'patient capital' that has existed in countries with a more 'relational 
investing' system."' 
The second set of implications of debt security rating governance have 
to do with policy choice in the liberal democracies. Governments have 
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increasingly financed their deficits with foreign debt during the 1980s. 
They 'now have to care about their international credit ratings' because 
they have to borrow in foreign currencies or have obligations to foreign 
investors."'1 In 1991, for example, non-resident investors held C$149.2 
billion of Government of Canada and provincial bonds, an 84 per cent 
increase from the C$81.3 billion they held in 1985."'1 Governments are 
now much more effectively accountable to the 'bond vigilantes' and 
'Masters of the Universe' and their agents than previously. Local policy 
decisions will be judged from the perspective of these external interests, 
within the context of assumptions about a liberal trade order and the free 
movement of capital within the GPE. Their debt exposures mean that 
governments are constrained to respond to this perspective. As Cox 
notes, among the very first acts of the new provincial government of 
Ontario in 1990 was for the recently installed Premier to visit New York to 
discuss credit issues with the rating agencies and other debt market 
players."2 Even where the actual magnitude of a downgrade is minor, as 
was the case when Standard & Poor's reduced the rating on the Govern- 
ment of Canada's C$9 billion debt denominated in foreign currency, the 
impact on the credibility of the issuer can be immense. As The Globe and 
Mail (Toronto) commented at the time, 
While the downgrade is expected to increase the federal govern- 
ment's borrowing costs only marginally in the near future, [private] 
investment officials said the action sent alarms throughout interna- 
tional markets that Canada's financial health is eroding. 'It's a 
warning bell that the country's finances are deteriorating. This will 
only add to investor worries about Canada,' a New York investment 
executive said."3 
For the developing countries, ratings provide perhaps the supreme seal 
of approval in their struggle to obtain development funds at a less than 
exorbitant cost, and with less risk than the recycled petrodollars they 
obtained from banks on floating interest rate contracts during the 1970s. 
Accordingly, in a recent Euromoney supplement on Mexico, there is a 
lengthy discussion of the probability of that country acquiring an invest- 
ment grade rating from Moody's and S&P.1"4 
Finally, there is the question of national determination and response to 
the growth of the US agencies' extra-US activities. Ten years ago Moody's 
and S&P had no analysts outside the USA. In 1993, they each had around 
100 employees altogether in Europe, Japan and Australia. S&P opened a 
new branch in Toronto during the spring of 1993. Questions arise then, 
especially in times of tension and transformation in European-American 
and Japanese-American relations, about the aspirations of the major 
United States rating agencies. Will countries find that the regulation of 
their financial systems, ways of reporting financial information, industry 
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practices and financial cultures change in accord with an American 
agenda? Who is likely to resist the spread of the American agencies? Is 
the internationalization of rating simply another step toward greater 
global financial integration, or do the American agencies represent a 
more parochial interest in financial organization? There is growing 
resentment toward the US agencies in Europe which seems to have 
crystallized around the 1991 downgrading of Credit Suisse, the early 1992 
downgrading of Swiss Bank Corporation and the longer-term problem 
that foreign agencies have had in getting SEC recognition in the USA as 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs)."1' 
NRSRO status is important because under many state laws US pension 
funds may not purchase bonds that have not been given an investment 
grade rating by an NRSRO, but only agencies rating US issues have been 
given this status by the SEC."6 These are all US agencies with the 
exception of IBCA, which has established a branch in New York, 
seemingly in order to qualify. Regulation is much less significant in 
Europe, although this is a developing situation. These tensions have led 
to private discussions in London, Paris and Frankfurt about the estab- 
lishment of a possible Europe-wide agency to compete with the major 
US-based agencies."7 In addition to this concern, which reflects the cross- 
national significance of the SEC, Europeans complain that 'being based 
in the US, the two global agencies simply don't understand non-US 
businesses'."18 
CONCLUSIONS 
The argument of this article is that debt security rating agencies are 
exemplars of the new location and form of authority that is shaping 
international relations in the emerging world order. There are three 
aspects to this authority. The first has to do with the division of authority 
between state and non-state institutions, the second concerns the dis- 
tribution of power among non-state institutions, and finally, the third 
has to do with conflict between rising and declining sectors of finance. 
The rise of the GPE and the decline of exogenous threats has changed the 
balance of authority between institutions of government and institutions 
of global civil society. Global civil society has become relatively em- 
powered while state institutions have become less significant in the way 
things get done. Although both elected authority and what might be 
called 'manifest authority' are bound together in many ways in terms of 
the reproduction of political order, the argument here is that the shift in 
authority, as exemplified by debt security rating, has changed the charac- 
ter of that order in significant ways. 
The second aspect of authority in the emerging world order to consider 
is its sectoral character. Although a shift from 'high' to 'low' politics, and 
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from state to non-state institutions within the GPE has been identified, a 
relocation of authority within the GPE itself is observed. This transfor- 
mation has involved the erosion of the control formerly exercised by 
some of the great industrial concerns, and a corresponding increase in 
the leverage available to financial forces and those industries in which 
information is the raw material and knowledge the product. The down- 
grading of General Motors by the rating agencies reflects this shift. 
Accordingly, finance may, to use Robert Cox's words, have increasingly 
'become decoupled from production to become an independent power, 
an autocrat over the real economy'."' 
The final aspect of the relocation of authority to consider are the 
transformations within the financial realm itself. International political 
economy has expended a great deal of its initial research effort on 
studying the activities of the major international banks and their regula- 
tion. This made a lot of sense when the LDC debt crisis threatened to 
overwhelm the international credit system. However, that risk did not 
materialize and banks have subsequently become the preserve of the 
most marginal users of funds in the United States, and increasingly 
elsewhere. In global capital markets, banks have been exposed to much 
greater competition by their governments and have come under pressure 
to play the markets like any other investor. The increased cost of this 
activity has been passed along to funds users, raising the cost of capital to 
them, reducing their demand and spurring the drive to securitization. 
With the growth of alternative mechanisms for gathering information 
about credits and producing saleable knowledge about them, the ra- 
tionale for banking intermediation of credit allocation is threatened. 
Banks will - in the medium term at least - continue to be major pools of 
funds because of their retail activities. But they will become less like 
lenders and more like portfolio managers, and consequently less like 
sources of authority in the market and more like just another part of the 
market itself.'20 The creation of knowledge and the passing of judgement, 
based on a strategic position in the production of financial, economic and 
policy information, will increasingly fall to debt security rating agencies. 
What will be the effect of all this upon the emerging world order? Two 
probable scenarios come to mind. On one hand, the regulatory mecha- 
nisms of governance identified in this article could engender a much 
more thoroughgoing hegemony than has been seen before. During the 
Cold War, the coherence of transnational relations was maintained by 
exogenous threats from the Soviet Union. The regulatory mechanism 
identified, and perhaps others like it, have the character of endogenous 
forces, at least as far as the advanced industrial societies are concerned. 
This will probably mute opposition, or as seems to be the case in Europe, 
channel that opposition into rating competition. For the developing 
countries, it seems that they are now playing a game with a very different 
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referee. Rating agencies, as mechanisms of governance without govern- 
ment do not invoke quite the same nationalist hostility that interstate 
regulation seems to, especially for elites in these countries, infused with a 
neo-liberal business ethos. The medium-term effect could be to further 
the strategy of new constitutionalism by removing many areas of domes- 
tic policy debate from the political arena, and to undermine radical 
intellectual elites as a new form of intellectual orthodoxy - economic and 
financial analysis - becomes the dominant framework in which policy 
issues are cast. On the other hand, this form of governance may be fragile. 
An order characterized by governance based in global civil society could 
conceivably be less dynamic than one with an active political executive. 
This could reduce the adaptive capacity of the global system, just as 
threats from transboundary problems like global warming become much 
more of a concern. It will certainly be the case that this order will be less 
inclusive than in the past. This may mean that the trend to urban decay 
typified by the City of Detroit may accelerate and spread to other areas of 
the world as they too come to be judged by this regulatory mechanism. 
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